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INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF 
AUTO-IN DUSTRIALIStv1 
AUTOMATION AND THE AUTOMATIC SOCIETY 
We have entered a period of momentous structural change.1 For those old 
enough to remember it, the shift we are experiencing is like that of the 1970s. 
Then we saw the onset of the post-industrial age. Mass manufacturing industries 
in the leading economies contracted. Parts of them were exported abroad - to 
China and elsewhere. The number of well-paid, blue-collar industrial jobs shrank 
dramatically. Lesser-paying service jobs expanded along with white-collar, pro-
fessional and para-professional work. The latter was fuelled by an expanding 
public sector. The government-education-and-health slice of the economy 
swelled. Theories of human capital and public goods boomed in popularity. This 
was accompanied in the private sector by the growth of media and communi-
cations industries and the information and knowledge economy. Information 
technology (IT) became pervasive. Computers appeared everywhere. Processes 
and products were digitized and networked. 
The post-industrial world, which we became familiar with, is now itself 
beginning to disappear. The shift to a markedly different social model - auto-
industrialism - is underway. The signs of this are all around us. Go to any big 
supermarket retailer today and you will see arrays of self-service check-outs. The 
auto-industrial era is an age of self-service. It is marked by a rising tide of do-it-
yourself (DIY), automated and robotic processes. There are continuities with 
the post-industrial age. The ubiquitous computer remains ubiquitous. However 
some things are noticeably different. Auto-industrialism does part of what post-
industrialism did. But it automates it. Customer-facing retail jobs were standard 
post-industrial fare. These are now being replaced by automated online pur-
chasing even at bricks-and-mortar locations. 
In the United Kingdom, between 2000 and 2015, 750,000 net jobs were lost 
in manufacturing and 338,000 in wholesale and retail. Two million jobs in that 
country (60 percent of the current retail workforce) are predicted to disappear 
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from the wholesale and retail sector by 2036.2 In-store shoppers increasingly 
prefer to interact with computers that provide information to assist their pur-
chases rather than a sales clerk. 3 Instead of being told by a sales assistant that 
an item is 'not in stock', machine-mediated retailing can sell customers goods 
that are not in-store but can be ordered for later pickup or delivery. The phe-
nomenon of 'click-and-collect' goods is on the rise with purchases made online 
and collected by the customer later from a physical location.4 The American 
retailer Macy's is adapting their chain of stores to function as pickup points for 
online purchasing. Supporting this in the background are computer algorithms 
that manage the retailer's inventory.5 Eventually delivery by concierge-style 
sole contractors and then drones, driverless cars and other robotic means will 
complete the online purchase system. A pilot is presently being conducted in 
the United Kingdom of knee-high, shopping cart-sized delivery droids to ser-
vice the last mile of retail delivery (which currently represents 30 to 40 percent 
of business delivery costs). 6 
Shops are not disappearing but their functions are changing. They are turn-
ing more into collection, experience or try-before-buy destinations than places 
of assisted sales.7 The numbers of sales assistants are shrinking.8 Naturally 
there is an element of commercial cost-saving in this just as (conversely) there 
remain customers who prefer the 'personal touch' and expect to deal with 
a store clerk. Yet it seems that the latter is a smaller cohort than once might 
have been assumed. Many individuals, it seems, prefer to be left alone when 
they make purchases.9 Australians today receive 36 million postal packages 
annually containing goods they have purchased online. Online retailing in the 
United Kingdom was 13.5 percent of market share in 2014 and 15.2 percent 
in 2015. 10 The US figures were 11 .6 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively. 11 
Each purchase replaces human-human interaction with machine-human inter-
action. A decade ago, people who booked overseas holiday travel used a travel 
agent; those numbers today have halved. Self-service, DIY, online ordering-
and-paying has visibly reduced the industry. Large numbers of people have 
decided that the time cost of doing-it-yourself outweighs the service value 
of a white-collar, or rather T-shirted, incrUstry operator doing it for you. Even 
in the realm of high culture, similar kinds of changes are occurring. Online 
art galleries are becoming increasingly important. They are in part displacing 
physical galleries. Andre Malraux's 1 museum without walls' is being realized. 
Human-machine interaction provides individuals with ready access to artworks 
whenever and from wherever. 
Machine automation is an expression of a deeper social shift. The growth of 
participation in and enjoyment of human-machine interaction over the historic 
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term indicates increasing levels of comfort with an automated society. This is 
a distinctive kind of modern society. It is one that is dominated by the imper-
sonal patterns of markets, industries, cities and publics.12 In an automated 
society, economic and social cycles, ratios, fractals and proportions play a deci-
sive role in long-term social development. They play a more decisive part than 
do directives, regulations, procedures, policies or rules. The tendency to auto-
mate social functioning is characteristic of high-functioning modern societies 
and economies. These have, to a notable extent, an impersonal, autonomously 
operating, self-regulating nature. J hey are animated by business, technology, 
political and urban cycles, phases and relations that have a quasi-life of their 
own. The price-to-earnings ratio, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the ideal or 'golden' 
ratio, the Fibonacci number series, the power law of city size, the Pareto 
(80-20) principle of cause-and-effect and scaling laws (like the quantity theory 
of money) provide constants in dynamic growth-orientated societies. These 
constants are not legislated; they are not tools for social engineering. They 
are not instruments designed for state intervention. Rather they provide dura-
ble form in fluid social environments. These environments change rapidly and 
yet their underlying principles are remarkably stable over time. 
Social laws in a world of freedom, surely not?13 Yet the paradox is that soci-
etal self-regulation and machine automation, far from being hostile to human 
freedom, are conducive to high levels of personal autonomy and individual 
freedom.14 The impersonal in this case strengthens the personal. At the level of 
industrial automation, impersonal interaction with machines allows individu-
als to more readily do things for themselves and reduces the pressures that 
accompany everyday functional and official relationships. Assuming it works 
well, human-machine interaction reduces the pressure of sales talk. It allevi-
ates the strain of dealing with petty officials and counter clerks. It removes the 
pain of listening to the spurious chatter of real estate agents. It obviates the 
ill-informed advice of the town council's trainee planning assistant. In short, it 
reduces the tiny coercions of everyday public life. 
Machines do not suit everyone. Some people prefer dealing with other 
people than dealing with machines. They resolutely resist the use of appliances 
and devices. Yet the popularity of automated teller machines (ATMs) for bank 
cash withdrawals suggests that technophobic attitudes to new generations of 
machines shrink over time. The first ATM was installed in 1969; there are now 
three million of these machines worldwide. Such is the nature of industrialism 
that even machines are replaced by machines. Today electronic funds transfer 
at point of sale is gradually reducing the use of ATMs. The human condition is 
such that human beings are double-coded. They see themselves through their 
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relationship with other human beings. They place great value on inter-subjective 
relationships. At the same time, human beings create their own artificial envi-
ronment. This is a 'second nature', consisting of made objects and artifices.15 It 
is composed of material items, buildings, tools and machines. Human beings 
surround themselves with objects. They make, buy, use, love and appreciate 
objects. They inhabit a world of objects. This world is a second nature, an artifi-
cial nature that complements the first nature of plants and animals. 
Human beings have a creative impulse. They like to give form and shape 
to things. They husband animals; garden plants and flowers; hammer wood; 
bolt steel; arrange pixels; code bits and bytes. This shaping or forming impulse 
is closely connected to the human identification with the symmetries, bound-
aries, cycles, waves and proportions of nature. In making beautiful things 
that are also useful, nature is recreated in a second nature, the object world 
of humankind. Cities, buildings, tools, machines and personal artefacts all 
belong to this object world. This explains the great affection individuals show 
towards trains, planes and cars, or their computers and mobile phones. This 
does not detract from the pleasure they have in interacting with other human 
beings. The object-world and the subject-world are not mutually exclusive. 
So auto-industrialism is not a threat to human relationships any more than 
the automobile was. This does not stop technophobic literary forms from 
imagining otherwise though. A civilization that loves its machines also loves 
to depict those machines rising up and taking over. But aside from cultural 
projections of fears and anxieties, auto-industrialism does not imply human 
alienation. Rather it does what all automation does: it eliminates routine work, 
both manual and intellectual. As interactions with machines increase, individu-
als still have intense personal interactions with others: with family, friends and 
acquaintances.16 But they opt out of other more procedural, instrumental and 
mundane interactions with their fellow human beings. In place of those pro-
saic exchanges, they instead opt for human-machine transactions because of 
their convenience and lack of pressure. 
The volume of human-machine iR,teractions is rising. Self-organizing 
machines are becoming increasingly common in everyday life. There are many 
examples of these: house vacuuming robots (Roomba), companion bots (Jibo), 
bartending bots (Monsieur), the multilingual retail bot (OSHbot) along with 
algorithm-driven market trading, automated intelligent searching of legal and 
medical records, autonomous weapons systems (Super Aegis), facial recognition 
surveillance software, market and opinion survey robocalls, voice recognition 
validation software, robotic healthcare assistants (Baymax) and self-driving 
vehicles. American's Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency was crucial 
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in the development of the Internet. Now it is developing the robotic battlefield. 
Japan today plans to take on China industrially with a massive program of robot 
factories. Foxconn, the giant Taiwan-based iPhone manufacturer, projects its 
own program of automation. Mainland China meanwhile is beginning a vigor-
ous transition from factory labour to robots.17 
How many commercial truck drivers or taxi drivers or fork-lift drivers will 
there be in 30 years' time? Likely, not many. The mining company Rio Tinto 
already operates autonomous haulage vehicles, drillers, ore dumpers, stackers 
and reclaimers in its mines. Fa911 robots will weed, prune, monitor produce, 
check on herds and harvest crops. The globalization era saw the export of tra-
ditional manufacturing jobs from developed to developing countries. Skilled 
jobs were replaced with service jobs. Now service jobs are being automated. 
Lowe's, the US hardware retailer, is trialling humanoid robot shop assistants. 
Japan plans robot nursing home assistants to cope with its aged population. 
Health assistants are one of the prime projected employment growth areas in 
the next 20 years. But what if these jobs are gradually replaced by machines? 
There are lots of long-term scenarios for wealth creation but few for job cre-
ation. Keeping in mind that jobs are a subset of occupations, it may turn out 
in the future that job creation is gradually overtaken by occupation creation in 
the self-employed sector.18 
Peopleless robot factories and driverless vehicles will transform labour mar-
kets. Many existing jobs will be eliminated. This applies not only to blue-collar 
work but also to pink-collar, white-collar, service and professional work. Low-
level medical diagnoses, preparation of tax returns, paralegal document searches 
and university essay marking in the foreseeable future will be automated. The 
same is happening already to the work of book-keepers, marketers and meter 
readers. Self-service is taking over airline check-in and supermarket check-outs. 
Any formula task can be automated. A lot of professional operations, as we are 
discovering, are just that: formulas. Some professional disciplines are finding 
that they cannot match the power of big data processing. Pattern recognition 
software for instance will replace much of radiology diagnostics. 
These are new developments but in a way also very old ones. The mix 
of computing, digital sensing and robotic handling on a mass scale is new. 
Yet the underlying driver of this, automation, is a fixture of industrial societ-
ies. It is a function as much of the essential continuity as it is of the perpetual 
change of industrial societies. It represents the essence or nature of industrial-
ism. Automation is a fixity amidst technological mutability; a variable invariant. 
Through more intense and less intense periods, it substitutes machines for hand, 
back and brain power. Today the spread of new generations of self-organizing 
' 
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machines is starting to have a visible impact on labour markets. This impact is 
being felt not just in one or two job market segments but rather across the full 
spectrum of service, blue-collar, white-collar, pink-collar, professional and para-
professional work. The graduate employment market accordingly is shrinking.19 
The mass demand for individuals with undergraduate degrees is declining rela-
tive to the demand for high school graduates and university postgraduates. 
The structure of the labour market is being reshaped. This is a consequence of 
long-term technology and employment trends. These trends reflect the shift 
from post-industrialization to auto-industrialization. 
THE END OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM 
Post-industrialization represented a tectonic change in the structure of 
employment. In the 1970s, Australia manufactured 500,000 cars annually and 
employed 90,000 workers in the auto industry. As of 2017 it will produce 
zero cars. In the 1970s and 1980s across the OECD, manufacturing industries 
declined. Factories were shuttered or relocated aboard. Middle-income blue-
collar work shrank. The public policy question then arose: what would replace 
these jobs? The answer was white-collar 'knowledge' work. Universities and 
colleges, it was thought, would educate the 'knowledge' workers of the future. 
What was the effect of that? Today a quarter or more of graduates never work 
in a job that requires a degree. As the size of the university and college sector 
grew so did the number of graduates working as taxi drivers.20 Human capital 
economics assumed that education determines economic outcomes. If any-
thing, the reverse is t he case. As enrolment numbers at universities expanded, 
the relative size of median graduate salaries shrank.21 Since 1990, the relative 
number of middle-income salaried jobs has shrunk as well. 
After 1970, in the leading industrial nations the scale of manufacturing 
decreased. The contraction of manufacturing was driven by industry eco-
nomics. Cheap labour abroad beckoned. Alternatively when factories stayed 
put, machines replaced labour. Work was automated. This reflected the logic 
of industrial society which is to substitu(e machines for routine labour. Post-
industrialization coincided with a political and cultural shift in major states. 
Social expectations were transformed by big government liberalism. In the 
post-industrial era, the focus of political attention shifted from production 
to distribution. The welfare state burgeoned. Crony capitalism multiplied. 
Grants and allocations captured the social imagination. Government debt 
and deficits increased. This debt was illusory money. It was easy to obtain but 
difficult to pay off. 
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The long-term consequences of post-industrialization were in many respects 
sullen. In advanced economies, the great wealth creation phase of the 1950s 
and 1960s stopped. Long-term real income and GDP growth flattened. Pundits 
promised that the workforce would become populated with glamorous highly 
educated symbol-users. University enrolments exploded. The class of public 
sector professionals and administrators swelled. The focus of post-industrialism 
was document production and rule generation. Fifteen percent of the GDP of 
advanced economies today is consumed by regulation. Even then not every-
one can be a document fabricator or rule processor. The alternative usually 
is a service job. Today graduates wait tables and drive taxis. Increasing num-
bers of people opt out of work altogether into government disability payment 
schemes.22 In the post-industrial era the moral crux of modern life, the work 
ethic, came under mounting strain. 
Today, for the first time in 40 years, there are tentative signs of a reaction 
against this. Post-industrialism has run its course. Twentieth-century Keynesian 
economics supposed that employment was a function of economic demand 
and that such demand could be stimulated by government spending. 23 Time 
and again that has proved not to be the case. This is because economies are 
foremost a function of supply and production rather than demand and distri-
bution. If economies fail to supply appealing goods, they falter. The popular 
music industry boomed in the 1960s and 1970s when it produced interesting 
artefacts. It is desultory today by comparison because it no longer does that. At 
times it blames the Internet for its woes. But the real cause of its decline is that it 
is one among many industries in the post-industrial period that lost its capacity 
to produce exciting or attractive goods. 
Over the long run the wealth-creating power of modern industrial capitalism 
has been remarkable. What has driven it has been the ability to create inge-
nious new products of lasting value, interest and utility. Equally remarkable have 
been the canny ways devised for producing these products. The first industrial 
revolution gave us the putting-out system (cottage industry). The factory sys-
tem followed. After that we had the production line, the firm and the modern 
organization. The least effective of all of these was 'the organization'. It dominated 
the post-industrial information age. This was the era of electronic documents 
and office software. While its advocates periodically promised the coming of the 
lean corporation, the principal legacy of IT in the post-industrial period was the 
relentless expansion of private and public bureaucracies. These produced moun-
tains of unproductive intangibles - reports, audits, assessments, reviews and 
regulatory frameworks. This documentary megalith was reflected in declining 
productivity and shrinking real wealth creation across the era. 24 
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From 1970 to 1990 the post-industrial script outwardly looked credible. 
The classic middle tier of industrial skilled work shrivelled but low-income 
service work, middle-income administrative and sales work and high-income 
high-tier professional work grew. Yet under the surface, another story began 
to take shape. This centred on the phenomenon of 'job polarization'.25 This 
development began to crystallize in 1990.26 It was first defined analytically in 
2003.27 Job polarization means the shrinking of middle-tier, middle-income 
work relative to low-income service work and high-income, high-end profes-
sional work. This is a function of technology. Both manual and office work are 
affected. Computerization today is eliminating routine administrative, service 
and retail work at an accelerating pace. Robots are replacing machine opera-
tors, assembly and production workers, miners and wharf labour. The mid-tier 
of occupations is contracting. At the same time, demand for low-skill service 
work has grown. A particular kind of service work (in security, cleaning, care 
and hospitality) requires manual dexterity. Such work (so far) has been resistant 
to automation. Demand for it has grown along with the demand for high-skill 
professional abstract labour that involves significant elements of interpretation, 
invention, judgement or creativity. The labour market in advanced economies 
is starting to look like an hour-glass, with growth at the top and the bottom 
and shrinkage in the middle. 
As a result of job polarization, the second half of the post-industrial era 
(the period between 1990 and 2010) started to generate an employment struc-
ture that was the opposite of what post-industrialization was meant to achieve. 
The effects of this incipient reversal have become clearer over time. Graduate 
employment in low-skill service occupations has grown. The premium received 
by young adults getting degrees (today 30 percent or more of them) has shrunk. 
In the 1950s, college graduates in the United States earned 2.3 times that of 
high school graduates. Now they earn 2.5 times a person with 8 years only of 
education. In many advanced economies, median income has flattened while 
the career income of the 10 percent of the young adult population who today 
undertake some kind of postgraduate degree has increased.28 The percentage 
of the population in 2005 getting PhDs Was about the same percentage of the 
population getting undergraduate degrees in 1955. Large numbers of young 
adults now go to university. However, the principal beneficiary of contempo-
rary higher education is the small postgraduate class whose labour is abstract. 
Demand, as expressed in income, continues to grow in the case of the relatively 
small 10 percent of the workforce whose labour leans heavily on calculation, 
interpretation, judgement, problem solving, reflexivity, coordination, ingenu-
ity, resourcefulness, imagination, originality, innovation and creativity. In the 
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near run, over the next decade demand is projected to be especially high for 
calculation-based expertise in business and financial operations, mathematics 
and computing. In contrast, the demand for qualified mid-tier salaried employ-
ees doing tasks that are well-defined, organized into clear analytical steps and 
firmly demarcated from other tasks - in short that are recurring, routine and 
methodical - is shrinking. Machines are replacing people in these roles. 
Where post-industrialism eviscerated manufacturing work in advanced 
economies, auto-industrial technologies are now eliminating routine work. 29 
This includes routine manual, ,Qffice, sales, service, para-professional and low-
end professional work. 30 As this technology wave further unfolds over the next 
10 and 20 years, much existing routine mid-tier pink-collar, white-collar and 
ancillary professional work will disappear. This has multiple implications. The 
need for mass higher education is shrinking. The world of 'the office' and the 
'sales department' staffed by middle-income workers with generic university 
degrees, doing defined repetitive tasks, is collapsing. 31 Computerization and 
automation are replacing these kinds of employees. 32 Thirty to forty percent of 
current occupations will be significantly affected by computerization and auto-
mation in the next 10 years. In effect, a net 15 to 20 percent of current jobs will 
disappear. The era of large-scale routine knowledge work is powering down. 
This change is occurring persistently on a large scale and over the long term. As 
manufacturing work in the 1970s was automated and offshored, routine office, 
sales and para-professional work is similarly being automated or offshored. 
By 2045 few mid-tier 'knowledge jobs' will be left. Whether for society this 
means structural unemployment or underemployment or else different kinds 
of occupation at this point in time is unclear. Mid-tier wage-and-salary work in 
accommodation, food, transport, real estate, retail sales, wholesale, manufac-
turing and mining will be reduced by automation. The prospect of alternate 
wage-and-salary employment in new labour-intensive industries appears slim 
though demand for certain kinds of dexterous manual occupations is growing not 
declining. Auto-industrial technologies will spawn distinctive occupations. Yet it is 
unlikely that these will generate the multiples of the kinds of mid-tier wage-and-
salary jobs that early- and mid-twentieth-century manufacturing industry did in 
the major economies of the time. The foreseeable effect of auto-industrialization 
will be the further reduction of mid-tier wage-and-salary employment. 
Does this then mean high rates of unemployment? This is unlikely to be 
the case in societies with aging and shrinking populations that are prepared 
to restrict the flow of migrants into their workforce. In such cases, automation 
and robotics will simply replace persons retiring and exiting the workforce. 
Furthermore automation will not affect all occupations. Demand for manually 
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dextrous service work that robots (yet) cannot do and for high-end abstract 
professional labour foreseeably will be sustained and conceivably will even 
expand. Current American 10-year projections of labour demand indicate near-
term high growth in financial management, health, construction and personal 
services. The latter three include considerable demand for persons with high 
school-only qualifications. 
Also notable is a long-term trend for individuals in major economies to 
generate income from capital rather than labour. Capital work has partially 
replaced wage-and-salary work. The self-employed sector including sole trad-
ers and partnerships has been growing over the long run. This shift is subtly 
reshaping the nature of work and occupations. The trend for 'income from 
capital' to grow relative to 'income from wage labour' began in the 1950s. It 
accelerated in the 1970s. It appears that it will persist, deepen and intensify 
in the foreseeable future. 33 This means that if there is a future expansion of 
mid-tier occupations these will most likely be sourced from the self-employed 
workforce. Demand for entrepreneurial nous is replacing demand for labour 
skills. Salaried work is declining and capital work is increasing. 
An analogous shift is reflected in the behaviour of traditional firms and their 
hiring practices. Around 2010 a new company hiring trend began to crystallize. 34 
This is a preference for employees with a mix of digital know-how, agility, cre-
ativity, entrepreneurship, problem solving and negotiating ability. 35 If we add to 
that list additional traits - like dexterity, adroitness, nimbleness, and a capac-
ity to decipher, elucidate, unravel and decode - a picture starts to emerge of 
the nature of the auto-industrial era employee.36 If a short-hand term is needed 
to sum up auto-industrial work, it would be problem solving. It does not mat-
ter whether we are talking about manual, office or professional work, problem 
solving stands in contrast to the processing fixation of post-industrial work. Post-
industrialism was built on a workforce engaged in routine detailed step-by-step 
process and procedure. This type of work followed well-defined pathways. If in 
the future machines increasingly do this kind of path-dependent work then what 
remains is nimble work. In the case of nimble work, tasks are not well defined, 
predictable or well rehearsed. This is irrespective of whether the task is physical, 
mental or both. Nimble work requires the ability to change orientation swiftly and 
initiate unpredicted or unusual sequences of actions. Metaphors of intellectual 
and physical swinging, spiralling, flipping, gyrating, rotating1 turning and self-
starting apply to this kind of work. 
Self-starting, problem-solving and adroit behaviours have increasing value 
in the auto-industrial age. Self-management in place of other-directed decision 
making is at a premium. But not all of contemporary culture is in sync with 
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this - far from it. Take the case of higher education. In 2015, 20 percent of 
UK university students surveyed said that they wanted to work for a large com-
pany and 34 percent for a medium-sized company. Only 6 percent of British 
students said they wanted to run their own business and only 10 percent wished 
to work for a start-up company. 37 Yet the underlying logic of the auto-industrial 
age favours small start-up companies, partnerships and sole proprietorships. 38 
Most net new employment today is generated by small businesses that are less 
than 5 years old with less than 250 staff and especially those with less than 50 
staff. 39 Auto-industrialism is in step with the larger historical trend for 'income 
from capital' to grow relative to 'income from wages and salaries'.40 
While auto-industrialism favours self-starters, post-industrial culture does 
not.41 This means that inherited social expectations are now at odds with 
contemporary social trends. Received expectations have been shaped by five 
decades of post-industrialization. The larger part of the twentieth century was 
dominated philosophically by state socialism. Government employment in 
major economies grew significantly. After 1970, a shift occurred. This was the 
era of post-industrial neo-socialism and social liberalism. The government sec-
tor continued to grow but this was matched and exceeded by the growth of 
the broader taxpayer-subsidized education and health sectors. Governmental, 
education and health lobbies all relied on something called 'knowledge' as 
their legitimation. These voluble interest groups each claimed they produced 
public goods or public benefits that embodied 'expertise', 'intelligence', 'know-
how' and 'information'. The reality though was somewhat different. What 
taxpayers paid for on an ever-escalating scale was process and administration. 
Ever larger portions of perpetually mounting education and health spending 
was not for education or health functions in the literal sense but rather for the 
bureaucratic processes and procedures that surrounded them. Intelligence was 
a euphemism for officialdom. The documentation of process was knowledge. 
Since the late nineteenth century, government service was legitimated even 
sanctified by claims to special knowledge or expertise. Such legitimations were 
intended to incite awe and mystery. The claim of government administrators 
to special knowledge was underwritten in the nineteenth century by civil ser-
vice examinations. In the twentieth century, the university degree replaced the 
legitimating function of the examination. As government grew, followed by 
public sector education and health, administration grew. Armed with univer-
sity qualifications battalions of administrators, officers, supervisors, managers, 
directors and executives populated the swelling ranks of education, health and 
government systems. They endowed these institutions with an aura of indis-
pensable self-importance. 
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Auto-industrialization represents the end of the post-industrial era. The age of 
the government, health and education juggernaut is over. This is not for ideolog-
ical or political reasons. In the 1980s, there was a period when the post-industrial 
expansion of the public sector and public subsidies was questioned, mainly 
in the Anglosphere. But this affected only the rate of expansion of the public 
sector. By the late 1990s and 2000s, the expansion was redoubled. Taxpayer-
funded or -subsidized jobs for teachers, nurses and care workers boomed (the 
latter pushed along by aging populations).42 Many expect this trend to continue 
in the future on the grounds that these are high-touch occupations immune 
from automation.43 This assumption though is questionable. Digitization offers 
serious prospects for the semi-automation online of higher education.44 The 'do-
it-yourself university' utilizing the vast store of open source content accessible 
on computers and phones has overtaken the historic function of adult educa-
tion. There are a variety of ways of thinking about this. One is self-education. 
Autodidactic models are already common in the IT industry. We will likely see the 
spread of self-education to other sectors. One of the keys to this is competency-
based degree-granting. This requires reputable examining bodies to offer serious 
testing of competency leading to a degree but without all the baggage of classes, 
tuition costs, campuses and car parks.45 
A person who is disciplined and motivated does not necessarily require any 
more than the unlimited resources of the Internet to learn and a rigorous inde-
pendent examining body in order to acquire a degree that has vocational power 
and credible standing. In truth, many of the best minds are self-taught whether 
they attend classes or not.46 For those who are less autodidactic in spirit, the 
degree-granting 'platform university' (with automated administration, micro-
campuses, online delivery and third-place meet-ups in disperse locations) is 
another conceivable option on the horizon.47 Robotics will deliver much in the 
way of rote learning technology in the same way in the 1970s the digital calcu-
lator replaced the manual slide rule. The patience of the robot in coping with 
the slow learner far exceeds that of any human being. Similarly in care and 
nursing, the scope for robotic care, diagno~stic aids and self-monitoring is large. 
In occupations like teaching, nursing and care, it is often underestimated how 
much of the work is routine, repetitive and how much of it requires the kind of 
infinite patience that human beings lack. 
Computers and robots are well suited to doing repetitive tasks. Consequently 
machines graced with various kinds of artificial intelligence (Al) have no better 
or more plausible application than in government. The scope that exists for 
shrinking government by automating it is enormous. Yet the nature of the state 
is such that it is always disposed to increase the size of officialdom rather than 
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decrease it. This implies that the automation of government administration will 
be resisted. 'Jobs' will be the cry; 'you are replacing good jobs with machines'. 
Indeed so, for that is the nature of industrial societies. The question is whenever 
jobs in a society are lost whether different kinds of occupations will arise to 
replace what has gone. 
There are varying scenarios concerning this. One, the optimistic scenario, 
says that overall technological change creates more jobs than it destroys.48 That 
does not obviate the depth of change, though. In industrial societies even over 
relatively modest historical inte,r;vals, the elimination of jobs is quite remarkable. 
In 1870, 50 percent of jobs in the United States were in agriculture; by 1900, 
that figure had fallen to 38 percent. Today the figure is 2 percent. Robotics will 
soon transform the remaining areas in agriculture where work is still performed 
by hand. Automation and mechanization are not new phenomena. They are 
part of the nature of industrialism. In an industrial society machines regularly 
replace repetitive work of all kinds - and have done so since the eighteenth 
century when industrial machines first appeared. Human-machine interaction 
is an essential part of living in an industrial society, whether the machine is a 
train, an automobile, an airplane, a computer or a robot. 
A second, more sceptical scenario suggests that the first scenario was true 
until the post-industrial era but since then a shift has occurred. Either fewer jobs 
or fewer mid-tier jobs have been created; unemployment is disguised by the 
proliferation of persons on disability benefits or the decrease in labour market 
participation. Major employers in new industries like IT employ far fewer people 
than large employers did in the era of classic mass manufacturing. In response 
to this a third, more optimistic scenario says that the second scenario is true but 
is offset by self-employment that is growing relative to salaried employment. 
The third scenario takes issue with technological pessimism and with knowl-
edge economy boosters alike. The tendency of technology change to stimulate 
basic fears has been long evident. Dark science fiction fantasies seem to follow 
the advance of computerization and robotics. Consequently, we will have more 
stories about cyborgs that have feelings, go on rampages, cause chaos, feign 
being human, kill us, meld with human beings, self-replicate, become con-
scious and eventually replace human beings. 
In a more prosaic vein, we will also have overexcited depictions of future 
mass joblessness. These will try and induce us to adopt guaranteed minimum 
income schemes.49 These schemes are designed to ensure that everyone has 
a basic income whether they work or not.50 They are specious. The modern 
welfare state already has endless schemes that guarantee income; all of these 
programs ironically though are dependent on the continued growth of wealth 
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itself, in turn, dependent on technological development. Portrayals of mass 
technological unemployment, like the rise of Skynet, the conscious Al in the 
Terminator movie, tap human anxieties in industrial societies. This does not 
make them anything more than fictions. 
The future looks rather more enticing than the pessimists suggest. 
Unconsciously they wish for a kind of neo-feudal welfare state. The state they 
envisage is populated by workless masses who live on minimum incomes. The 
machines have taken all the jobs. Income is transferred by a benevolent state 
elite from the technologically crafty corporate elite. Whether this is depicted 
in dystopian or utopian terms, or both, the instinct is nee-patrimonial. The 
morbid vision of mass technological unemployment is a hook upon which to 
raise up, yet again, another client-patron model of society. 51 This vision seems 
ineradicable, whether it is the ancient Roman dole, medieval feudalism, mod-
ern socialism, post-modern rent seeking or auto-industrial minimum income 
schemes. That said, even if (as probable) mass technological unemployment 
does not eventuate, far-reaching changes in the character and type of employ-
ment are on the cards. Tomorrow will not be business-as-usual. There are major 
structural social changes afoot. These involve the reshaping of occupational 
structures, the nature of work, the relation between capital and labour and the 
relation between human beings and machines. This social reshaping will be 
deep-going, confronting and painful. It will challenge many cherished expecta-
tions. It will demolish many truisms about work and wealth. It will upset many 
people. Welcome to the auto-industrial age. 
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